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1 Introduction
Many multinational companies use an internal banking and coordination cen-
ter. One example is Statoil, one of the largest oil companies in the world,
whose internal bank and coordination center is located in the small town of
Mechelen in Belgium. The center serves approximately 130 a¢ liates world-
wide, and made a prot of 300 million euro in 2005.1 One reason why Belgium
is so popular among multinationals may be the Belgian coordination regime,
which provides widespread tax benets for multinationals with group nance
centers in Belgium. Under this system the tax base of the internal bank con-
sists of costs minus wages and nancial costs. After these deductions, the
tax base is increased by 8 percent and subject to a tax rate of 34 percent.2
It is well known that multinationals can use internal debt to save tax
payments by utilizing di¤erences in national tax rates. Less understood is
how minority ownership a¤ects tax-e¢ cient nancing structures in multina-
tionals. Multinationals often have the option to own 100%, the majority,
or be in a minority position in newly created foreign entities. We set up a
simple model of how a multinational structures its nancial transactions and
show that multinationals with tax-e¢ cient nancing structures have higher
internal and overall debt ratios and lower rental rates of physical capital than
comparable domestic rms. We also nd that a¢ liates with minority owners
use less internal debt than comparable a¢ liates without minority owners and
thus engage less in tax avoidance strategies. This result is in stark contrast
to the literature on transfer pricing where it has been shown that minority
ownership increases prot shifting by transfer pricing since multinationals
1A feature article on this bank was provided in Dagens Næringsliv 7 May 2007,
pages 16-17. See also: http://www.atel.lu/atel/fr/conferences/reunions/20010620/Statoil
%20Internal%20Bank%20presentation%20ATEL.pdf
2This system is under pressure from the EU, but it will at least be in place for the
year 2010 if not longer. A new system called the Notational Deduction (NID) system
has already been set up as an alternative for multinationals seeking tax-e¤ective nance
company arrangements.
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want to avoid sharing prots with minority owners (see Kant, 1988).
The reason why a¢ liates with minority owners have less internal debt is
due to a positive externality. Minority owners benet in full from tax plan-
ning, but do not wholly contribute to the set up of a tax-e¢ cient nancing
structure. The implication is that the multinational rm cannot internalize
the benets of tax planning in a¢ liates with minority owners. Consequently,
such a¢ liates have less tax-e¢ cient nancing structures and less internal
debt. Our result suggests that whole ownership should be most common in
a¢ liates that benet the most from a tax-e¢ cient nancing structure, and
that these a¢ liates should be located in high-tax countries. Furthermore,
a¢ liates with minority owners should have higher tax payments than wholly
owned a¢ liates, other things being equal.
Our model is related to a small but growing literature on multination-
als and their tax-e¢ cient structures. Mintz and Smart (2004) show how
multinationals may use direct nancial techniques, such as lending among
a¢ liates, to reduce tax payments. They then test their model on Canadian
data nding support for the hypothesis that this type of income shifting has
pronounced e¤ects on provincial tax bases. Mintz (2004) investigates how a
multinational parent can use conduit companies to create a chain of compa-
nies to shift funds and obtain at least two deductions of interest.3 Finally,
Weichenrieder (2008) studies prot shifting using a theoretical model with
minority ownership. His model is focused on traditional transfer pricing and
FDI rather than on tax-e¢ cient nancing structures. Using German data
on inbound and outbound FDI, he nds a strong empirical correlation be-
tween the home country tax rate of the parent and the net protability of its
German a¢ liate that is consistent with prot shifting behavior.
There is also an empirical literature on tax-e¢ cient nancing structures
that conrms the results we derive in our model. A discussion of this lit-
3See also Mintz and Weichenrieder (2007) for a more elaborate model of holding com-
panies and ownership chains. Less related but in the same vein are Fuest and Hemmelgarn
(2005) who study prot shifting through thin capitalization in a setting of tax competition.
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erature is deferred to Section 4. Below, Section 2 outlines the basic model,
while Section 3 analyzes the optimal tax avoidance strategies of a multi-
national that uses debt to reduce tax payments. Section 4 discusses and
relates our results to existing empirical studies, whilst Section 5 o¤ers some
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a national rm which can invest in n countries. The price-taking
rm employs Ki units of capital and Li units of labor in order to produce
F (Ki; Li) units of an output good whose price is normalized to one. The
production function F (Ki; Li) exhibits positive and decreasing returns to
each input, i.e. Fx > 0 and Fxx < 0 for x 2 fKi; Lig. Capital is assumed
to be perfectly mobile and the rental cost of capital per unit is r > 0 and
is assumed to be xed (i.e., the usual small country assumption). When
the rm invests in another country, it becomes a multinational rm (MNC).
We assume that the MNC owns at least the majority of each a¢ liate and
the sum of minority shares in a¢ liate i is Ji < 50% 8 i. The MNC seeks
to maximize its share in overall prots after corporate taxation, aggregated
over all a¢ liates.
The focal point here is to investigate how the rm can save tax payments
by a strategy of borrowing and lending among a¢ liates incorporated in dif-
ferent countries. We do not model a preferential tax for nancial centers
(such as the Belgian). Rather the purpose of our model is to investigate how
di¤erences in national tax rates and minority ownership a¤ect tax-e¢ cient -
nancial structures. In undertaking this analysis we shall assume without any
consequence for our results that debt is fully tax deductible in any country.
The rm nances its investments in country i by equity (and retained
earnings) Ei or debt Di. Debt Di can be further classied as external debt 
DEi

or internal debt
 
DIi

, where internal debt is obtained by borrowing
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from related a¢ liates. We dene Ki as the total capital employed by a¢ liate
i; and let i = DEi =Ki be the external debt to capital ratio, and i = D
I
i =Ki
the internal debt to capital ratio. The overall leverage ratio of the rm can
be expressed as bi = i+i =
 
DEi +D
I
i

=Ki:Within the multinational rm
it must be the case that the sum of interest payments on internal borrowing
and lending is zero across all a¢ liates, that is,X
i
r DIi =
X
i
i  r Ki = 0
We follow most of the literature on debt structure by assuming that there
are costs per unit capital associated with borrowing that are given by the
function C = C(i; i):4 For internal debt, these costs may be due to the use
of lawyers and accountants to avoid that such transactions are restricted by
thin capitalization or controlled foreign company rules.5 For external debt
these costs may pertain to informational asymmetries between investors and
managers of the rm. There is an optimal leverage ratio i for external debt
in the absence of taxes.6 The reason is that external debt is useful in order
to discipline local managers from lax management and empire-building
strategies. However, if the leverage ratio goes up, the risk of bankruptcy
increases and may cause bankruptcy costs or induce the local managers to
become too risk-averse. Increasing external debt from a leverage ratio i < i
will then decrease leverage costs, whereas any increase for i  i will cause
positive marginal costs of (external) leverage.
It follows from the discussion above that the costs and benets of internal
4See for example Mintz and Smart (2004) and Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005).
5Thin capitalization rules are in place in many countries. For a recent survey on US
rules see Hauer and Runkel (2008); and Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) on the
German tax code. Gouthière (2005) and Dourado and de la Feria (2008) describe thin
capitalization rules for most OECD and EU countries. Controlled foreign company rules
are in place, e.g., in the US and Germany and they deny tax-exemption of passive income
in the home country of the MNC, provided that tax avoidance is suspected (see Ruf and
Weichenrieder, 2008).
6See, e.g., Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005), p. 513, or Huizinga et al (2008), p. 94.
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and external debt are very di¤erent. Internal debt should rather be seen as
tax-favored equity, as it does neither a¤ect, e.g., the risk of bankruptcy nor
reduce any informational asymmetry or tighten hands of managers.7 In line
with this reasoning we assume that the cost function is additively separable,
that is C(i; i) = C + C, as long as external credit markets are perfect.
We shall also assume that the cost function is convex in  and in : The
convexity related to internal debt () is due to the fact that additional e¤ort
needs to be made to conceal the true nature of the transaction from the tax
authorities, whilst the convexity for external debt can be associated with a
higher premium due to informational asymmetries. Formally the properties
applied to the cost function can be summarized as
Assumption 1 External credit markets are assumed to be perfect. The cost
function related to borrowing external and internal debt is additively separa-
ble, C(i; i) = C + C, and exhibits
C(i) > 0 with C
0
(i) > 0; C
00
(i) > 0; if i  i
C
0
(i) < 0; C
00
(i) > 0; if i < i
C(i) > 0 with C
0
(i) > 0; C
00
 (i) > 0; if i > 0
C(i) = 0 with C
0
(i) = 0; if i  0:
It follows from Assumption 1 that if an a¢ liate lends money to a related
a¢ liate, there are no costs associated with lending.
3 Optimal Investments
The multinational rm consists of n entities (subsidiary rms). Each sub-
sidiary is either fully owned (Ji = 0), or has minority owners (Ji < 50%).
7In line with this Chowdhry and Coval (1998) p. 87f, and Stonehill and Stitzel (1969)
also argue that internal debt should be seen as tax-favored equity.
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The MNC maximizes its net after-tax global prots,
 =
nX
i=1
(1  Ji)
 
i   titi

; (1)
where i is economic prot in subsidiary i; ti is taxable prot, and ti is
the corporate tax rate in country i: Many countries as well as the European
Union uses the tax-exemption principle whereby repatriated dividends to a
parent rm are exempted from home taxation. We shall therefore assume
this to be the case throughout the analysis.8
True economic prot is given by revenue from the sale of an output good
minus labor costs and the user costs of capital,
i = F (Ki; Li)  wi  Li   [r + C(i) + C(i)] Ki; (2)
where wi is the wage rate, r is the world market interest rate, and Li is labor
employed. Taxable prot di¤ers from true economic prot in that only labor
expenses and borrowing costs are tax deductible,
ti = F (Ki; Li)  wi  Li   r 
 
DEi +D
I
i
  [C(i) + C(i)] Ki:
In dening taxable prot we have assumed that costs per unit of capital
associated with both external and internal borrowing are tax deductible.
Such costs may in part be associated with informational asymmetries between
investors and managers or with acts in violations of the tax code, and it could
be argued that such costs should not be tax deductible. It is straightforward
to show by examination of the equations to follow that the inclusion of these
as tax deductible does not a¤ect our results. Rearranging taxable prot we
8The tax exemption principle is given by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in the Euro-
pean Union. Altshuler and Grubert (2002) study the e¤ects of repatriation taxes and the
strategies used to avoid them using US data.
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obtain
ti = F (Ki; Li)  wi  Li   [r  (i + i) + C(i) + C(i)] Ki; (3)
where capital invested in country i is nanced either by debt Di = DIi +D
E
i
or by equity Ei;
Ki = D
I
i +D
E
i + Ei:
In line with most countriestax code we shall assume that equity Ei is
not tax deductible. In the next subsections the objective is to characterize
the optimal nancial structure and production decision of the multinational
rm. Our focal point, however, will be on how the multinational rm can
legally save tax through tax planning and the use of an internal banking
system. We start by considering the prot maximizing nancial structure
and then proceed by examining optimal supply of the nal good.
We shall maximize the value of the multinational rm after corporate
taxes, neglecting any e¤ect that personal taxes may have. This is in line with
most of the literature on multinationals and is reasonable since multinationals
are either owned by many institutional investors or shareholders located in
di¤erent countries.9
9It can be shown that from the viewpoint of a shareholder in a multinational rm,
maximizing prots of the MNC after global corporate taxation and maximizing the net
pay-o¤ on equity investment after opportunity costs and personal (income) taxes, yield
identical results under mild assumptions. For example, if corporate taxes cannot be de-
ducted against personal income tax and if the personal tax rate on dividends and interest
income is the same, it is straightforward to show that maximizing the value of the rm to
the owner and maximizing corporate prots coincidence. These restrictions are fullled
for a wide range of real world tax codes: the classical corporate taxation system (e.g., in
the US), the new German system starting in 2009 (Abgeltungssteuer), where interest
income, dividends and capital gains are taxed at 25% and deductions for corporate taxes
are not possible, and the Norwegian shareholder tax, introduced in 2006.
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3.1 Prot maximizing nancial structure
The maximization procedure of the rm can be seen as a two-tier process
whereby the nancial structure is rst optimized and then the rm decides
on how much of the nal good to produce in each country. Thus, taking real
investment Ki as xed initially the rms optimal nancial structure is found
by maximizing equation (1). Inserting for i and ti and collecting terms, the
maximization problem is given by
max
i;i
X
i
(1  Ji) 

(1  ti)  [F (Ki; Li)  wi  Li]
 Ki [r (1  ti  [i + i]) + (1  ti)  (C(i) + C(i))]
	
(4)
s:t:
X
i
i  r Ki = 0
It is seen from equation (4) that minority ownership in country i reduces
the prot in country i and thus global after-tax prot as well. It does not,
however, a¤ect the constraint that all interest payments between a¢ liates
must sum up to zero.
The rst order conditions to the maximization problem above are given
by:
C
0
(i) =
ti
1  ti  r > 0 8 i (5)
C
0
(i) =

ti  r
1  ti  
  r
(1  Ji)(1  ti)

=
[(1  Ji) ti   ]  r
(1  Ji)(1  ti)  08 i (6)
These rst order conditions state that the rm will use both types of
debt until the marginal costs associated with each type of debt are equal
to the respective marginal tax savings. The e¤ect of taxation is to reduce
the cost of external borrowing as is evident from equation (5). All a¢ liates,
therefore, have a tax-induced optimal leverage ratio of , which is higher
than the optimal external debt ratio in the absence of taxation dened as 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(so  > ):
As for internal debt, the Lagrangian multiplier  in equation (6) can be
shown to be equal to the minimum e¤ective tax costs te = (1   J)  t, and
hence  = mini[(1   Ji)  ti]. We shall assume that there is at least one
country, here called country 1, which is a low tax country in the sense that
the e¤ective tax payments for the MNC are lower in this country than in
others. Thus, te1 = (1   J1) t1 < (1   Ji) ti = tei 8 i 6= 1 so that  = te1.
The existence of a low tax country means that the a¢ liate located in this
country has the lowest funding costs and thus receives additional equity from
the multinational parent, say, equal to EI =  DI1 =
P
i6=1 i Ki > 0: The
implication is that the multinational rm reduces its equity in all a¢ liates
i > 1, and concentrates its equity EI1 in country 1. This country will then
conduct the lending operations of the multinational rm.
In order to see how the multinational benets from utilizing the low-tax
country, notice that by endowing its a¢ liate in the low-tax country with
equity and lending money back to a¢ liates in high-tax countries, the tax
savings in high-tax countries exceed tax payments in the low-tax country. It
should be pointed out that the lending activities in the low-tax country are
loss-making for two reasons:10 First, we assume that the a¢ liate in country
1 cannot engage in transfer pricing by charging borrowing a¢ liates a higher
interest rate than its own rate of funding. This is a reasonable assumption
since interest rates are easily observed by tax authorities in nancial mar-
kets. Second, since equity is not tax deductible, lending transactions yield an
economic loss due to incomplete tax deductibility.11 The loss in the a¢ liate
in country 1 from internal lending equals  EI1  t1r; which is the opportunity
10That is (1   t1t1) < 0:
11Note, however, that based on accounting values, the low tax a¢ liate is running a
surplus (t1 > 0); since the return to equity is not deducted as a cost. There is indeed
evidence (the case of Statoil being one) suggesting that nancial centers derive a surplus
as well. In addition to interest income, surpluses may also be due to the fact that nancial
centers can charge service fees.
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cost of equity multiplied by the tax rate.12 However, borrowing a¢ liates can
deduct the cost of internal debt against a higher tax rate than the tax rate in
the low tax country. For the multinational rm as a whole, then, the loss by
the lending a¢ liate is more than o¤set by tax savings in borrowing a¢ liates.
In order to see how tax policy a¤ects debt structure we nd by implicit
di¤erentiation for all i = 2; :::; n; that
di
dti
=
r
(1  ti)2  C 00(i)
> 0; (7)
di
dti
=
(1  Ji)  (1  ti) + [(1  Ji)  ti   te1]
(1  Ji)  (1  ti)2  C 00 (i)
 r > 0; (8)
di
dte1
=   r
(1  Ji)  (1  ti)  C 00 (i)
< 0; (9)
where (1  Ji)  ti   te1 > 0 due to te1 = mini[(1  Ji)  ti].
As seen from (7) and (8), an increase in the domestic tax rate ti increases
marginal tax savings from tax-deductible debt in country i and leads the rm
to increase its leverage ratio of both types of debt (i.e., higher i and i). In
contrast, an increase in the tax rate of the low-tax country (te1) makes tax
avoidance through internal debt more expensive, because the shifted interest
payments now bear a higher tax burden in the tax haven. Consequently, the
use of internal debt should decrease in all a¢ liates resulting in equation
(9).13
It follows from conditions (7) to (9) that a¢ liates in high-tax jurisdic-
tions have higher internal debt ratios than a¢ liates in low-tax jurisdictions.
Furthermore, since purely domestic rms cannot engage in cross country tax
planning their internal debt ratio should be zero. Notice that external debt
ratios are the same for all rms within the same country as long as As-
12Omitting sales and leverage costs (C) for the purpose of showing this, economic prot
from lending by the nancial center is 1  t1t1 =
L1r   r  DE1 + EI1  t1 L1   rDE1  ;
where L1 = DE1 +EI1 is lending. Simplifying this expression yields 1   t1t1 =  EI1  t1r.
13Note that the e¤ective tax rate te1 does not a¤ect external debt as long as external
and internal debt are separable in the debt cost function (see Assumption 1).
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sumption 1 holds. Consequently, multinationals with tax-e¢ cient nancial
structures should have higher overall debt ratios than domestic rms in the
same industry.
The issue of how minority ownership a¤ects multinational behavior has
received substantial attention in the literature on transfer pricing, and it
is well known that minority ownership increases the incentive to shift prof-
its (see e.g., Kant, 1988). The reason is that foreign ownership acts as an
additional tax on prots, which increases the e¤ective tax rate. Thus, the
higher the minority ownership share (and therefore the e¤ective tax rate),
the greater is the incentive for the multinational to shift prot away from
a¢ liates with minority owners.
We show a new result. Minority ownership dampens the incentive to shift
prot by way of setting up a tax-e¢ cient nancing structure. The reason is
that tax savings by a¢ liate i > 1 benet all owners equally. However, since
minority owners do not pay for the cost of equity or debt in the low-tax
a¢ liate, the multinational rm bears the full nancing costs, but it cannot
internalize the full gain. It is this externality that explains why minority
ownership dampens the incentives to use debt in a¢ liates with minority
owners. Formally,
di
dJi
=     r
C 00 ()  (1  Ji)2  (1  ti)
< 0; i > 1: (10)
Equation (10) shows that the internal debt ratio falls more rapidly the greater
the minority ownership share in a¢ liate i (Ji increases). In contrast, equation
(9) shows that if the minority ownership rate rises in the low-tax a¢ liate,
tax planning by debt goes up in all borrowing a¢ liates. The reason is that
the loss incurred by the lending a¢ liate is then to a larger extent borne by
its minority owners making it less costly to fund tax planning by debt.14
The optimal internal debt ratio can be deduced by inverting the rst
14It should be noted that minority ownership does not a¤ect external debt leverage,
because the incentive for external debt is independent of the ownership structure.
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order condition (6),
i = C
0 1


ti
1  ti  
te1
(1  Ji)  (1  ti)

 r

; (11)
and the net gain of tax planning per unit invested in country i can be written
as
 i (ti; t
e
1; Ji) =

ti   t
e
1
1  Ji

 r  i   (1  ti)  C(i ): (12)
For ti >
te1
1 Ji we have 

i > 0 and  i(ti; t
e
1; Ji) > 0, whereby the latter stems
from C being strictly convex for all  > 0. Applying analogous arguments,
we get from equation (5) that the optimal external debt ratio in a¢ liate i is
equal to
i = C
0 1


ti  r
1  ti

; (13)
and the maximum net gain from external debt per unit capital invested
becomes
i(ti) = ti  r  i   (1  ti)  C(i ) > 0: (14)
3.2 Optimal real investment and production
Given optimal values i and 

i , and therefore optimal net gain functions
for external and internal debt (i and  i), the e¤ective capital cost (~r) after
taxation in a¢ liate i is given by
~ri = r   ti  r  i + (1  ti)C(i ) 

ti   t
e
1
1  Ji

 r  i + (1  ti)  C(i )
It is straightforward to simplify this expression as follows
~ri = r   i(ti)   i(ti; te1; Ji):
Using the optimal nancial strategies and e¤ective capital costs in the
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prot function of the multinational, the maximization problem for the choice
of capital and labor is
max
Li;Ki
X
i
(1  Ji)  f(1  ti) [F (Ki; Li)  wi  Li]
  [r   (ti)   i(ti; te1; Ji); ] Kig:
The rst order conditions are given by
F iL = wi; (15)
F iK =
r
1  ti  
i(ti)
1  ti  
 i(ti; t
e
1; Ji)
1  ti ; (16)
where the two last terms on the right hand side of equation (16) are the
tax savings due to the use of external and internal debt. It is seen that these
tax savings reduce the user cost of capital. We can therefore conclude that
a¢ liates of multinationals with tax-e¢ cient nancial structures have lower
costs of capital and thus invest more in capital than comparable domestic
rms (within the same industry). Furthermore, the higher the corporate tax
rate, the larger is the subsidy from debt on the user cost of capital.
Equations (15) and (16) also enable us to derive the marginal rate of
technical substitution (MRTS) between capital and labor as follows
 dKi
dLi
=
FL
FK
=
wi
r   i(ti )
1 ti  
 i(ti;t
e
1;Ji)
1 ti
: (17)
Equation (17) suggests that if the wage rate is the same across all rms,
multinationals have a higher MRTS than domestic rms. As argued by Lipsey
(2002), there is an extensive literature showing that multinationals on average
pay higher wages than at least privately owned local rms. This suggests that
the wage rate may be higher in multinationals and that the relative size of
MRTS across national and multinational rms may be ambiguous. Only if
the inuence on the cost of capital in the denominator exceeds the higher
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wage being paid, will MRTS be larger. Empirical evidence from a number of
countries suggests that this is the case and that accordingly multinationals
have a higher capital to employee ratio than national rms.15 Part of this
may then be explained by lower borrowing costs.
It is worth pointing out that the e¤ects described in equations (16), and
(17) should be weaker in case of minority ownership (higher Ji) and in joint
ventures, since internal debt is less attractive and capital costs are higher
in such rms compared to fully-owned subsidiaries (Ji = 0) within the same
sector. This is an issue that we will discuss in the next section.
4 Empirical Evidence
One of the main ndings of our model is the prediction that both internal
and external debt can be used to save tax payments. There are several em-
pirical studies showing that debt, and especially internal debt, is used for tax
planning purposes. These studies show that the e¤ect of tax rate di¤erences
is (highly) signicant, but mostly rather small. Findings consistent with this
observation are found in Desai et al (2004a) relying on US data, Mintz and
Smart (2004), using data from Canada, Huizinga et al (2008), exploiting
the European Amadeus data base, and Büttner et al (2006b), who replicate
Desai et al using German data.
The issue of minority ownership and its e¤ect on tax planning is inves-
tigated in several papers. Desai et al (2004b) analyze the determinants of
partial ownership of the foreign a¢ liates of U.S. multinational rms and in
particular the marked decline in the use of joint ventures over a 20-year pe-
riod. Their analysis is purely empirical and suggests that there is an increased
appetite for control by multinational parents. They attribute this to three
di¤erent coordination costs. First, costs pertaining to minority ownership
15For a survey of empirical evidence related to capital to labor ratios and factor markets
see Navaretti and Venables (2004, ch. 7).
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and transfer pricing conicts; second the risk of technology being appropri-
ated by local partners; third, the desire to structure production worldwide
and the potential for conict this creates with minority owners. Our analy-
sis shows that there is a fourth cost element at play as well. There is a
scal externality related to minority ownership that makes it less protable
for the multinational rm to set up tax-e¢ cient nancing structures in such
a¢ liates.
The issue of minority ownership and tax avoidance strategies is dealt with
in particular by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), and Büttner and Wamser
(2007). Both these studies use the German MiDi (Bundesbank) data base.
They show, in line with the predictions that follow from our model, that
minority ownership exerts a negative e¤ect on the use of internal debt. In
particular, Büttner and Wamser (2007, p. 22) nd that the leverage ratio of
internal debt is 5 (respectively 2) percentage points higher in wholly-owned
(respectively partially-owned) subsidiaries compared to non-majority owned
ones.
It should be pointed out that Mintz andWeichenrieder (2005) do not have
a model to back their regression results, and Büttner and Wamser (2007) do
not model minority ownership. Both studies, however, explain the higher
internal debt content in fully owned a¢ liates by arguing along the lines of
Desai et al (2004b): the argument being that minority ownership exerts a
negative e¤ect on the use of internal debt due to increased coordination costs
in shared ownership. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005, p. 11) also argue that
minority owners would not be in favor of tax planning and prot shifting.
They state: Coordinating several owners may be di¢ cult if these owners
face di¤erent nancing and tax conditions  after all, minority sharehold-
ers of a subsidiary do not benet in the same manner from world-wide tax
minimization strategies desired by the parent.
In contrast, we show that minority owners benet from tax planning, but
that they do not pay the full costs associated with facilitating tax avoidance.
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This creates an externality which reduces the protability of using internal
debt in these a¢ liates. Put di¤erently, the main reason why there is less
internal debt in a¢ liates of multinationals with minority owners is not due
to increased coordination costs, but to a positive externality. The use of
internal debt implies that economic after-tax prot rises for all shareholders,
but since minority owners do not contribute to paying for the subsequent rise
in tax payments by the MNCs nancial coordination center, the majority
owner pays too much of the investment cost and does not reap the full
benet of his investment.
Our results and intuition also seem to t to Japanese data on tax-mo-
tivated prot-shifting between a¢ liates in Japanese keiretsus. Gramlich et
al (2004) study how pre-tax prots in such a¢ liates are a¤ected, compared
to independent rms, and they dene a keiretsu as a (diversied) industrial
grouping sharing the same nancial institutions or being organized around
the same main bank. Though not dealing with internal debt in detail, Gram-
lich et al (2004) show that a higher leverage signicantly decreases taxable
income (table 4). Moreover, pre-tax income decreases more sharply the closer
the a¢ liation to a keiretsu (p. 221). They do not nd support for com-
pensatory dividends between keiretsu members (table 6). The results by
Gramlich et al (2004) are not backed by a theoretical model and are some-
times lacking explanations, e.g., they confess on page 223, that there may
be other vehicles beyond dividends for compensating income shifting among
the keiretsu member rms.
If their dummy variableK2 for presidents council members is interpreted
as proxy for decreasing minority ownership, the e¤ect of closer a¢ liation to
the keiretsu on pre-tax income might be explained in line with our model-
ing of higher internal debt due to less minority ownership. Moreover, we
have shown that compensating dividends from the lending to the borrowing
a¢ liate are not necessary, as the tax-savings, and therefore the return on tax-
avoidance accrues in the borrowing a¢ liate. Thus, the more prot-shifting in
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the keiretsu that is done by internal debt, the weaker and the more insignif-
icant should the results on compensating dividends in Gramlich et al (2004)
be expected to be.
In our modeling, we have neglected thin capitalization rules which intro-
duce a cap on the amount of tax deductible (internal) debt. Such rules could
either be interpreted as increasing the costs of internal debt or as explicit
caps on the use of internal debt. Either type of rule would reduce the lever-
age ratio of internal debt and lead to higher e¤ective capital costs. Other
things being equal this would reduce real investment. Including such rules
in our analysis would, however, not change our results qualitatively as long
as the multinational rm has some leeway in terms of manipulating its lever-
age ratio. This view is backed by empirical results in Büttner et al (2006a)
and Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008). They nd that thin capital-
ization rules decrease (intercompany) loans, but increase equity. However,
they also nd that these e¤ects are so small that they probably do not a¤ect
real investment. Their explanation for this result is that rms can fairly
easily circumvent thin capitalization rules by setting up a holding company
structure. Moreover, the relevance of strict thin capitalization rules is the-
oretically challenged by the fact that weakening these rules is a dominant
strategy in corporate tax competition (see Hauer and Runkel, 2008).
Another instrument used as an attempt to prevent prot-shifting via in-
ternal debt is controlled foreign company (CFC) rules. If these rules apply,
income from subsidiaries is taxed in the home country of the MNC and the
exemption principle does not apply. Taxation under CFC-rules mostly re-
quires that there is passive income and low taxation.16 Relying on German
Bundesbank MiDi data, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2008) nd in an empirical
study that German CFC-rules are e¤ective in reducing passive investments
(i.e., setting up nancial centers) in o¤-shore tax havens (such as the Cay-
16See Ruf and Weichenrieder (2008), section 2, on how the German tax code denes
passive and active income.
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man Islands and Barbados). However, they do not a¤ect investments in the
Benelux countries, since these are not deemed to be low-tax countries. Thus,
the CFC-rules do not apply in these countries despite the fact that they in
many cases have more favorable tax rules than most low-tax countries.17 In-
deed, as a result of this a lot of MNCs have located their nancial centers in
the Benelux (see Mintz, 2004, section 2, and Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008,
section 2.1).
5 Conclusions
We show that multinational rms can save tax by setting up tax-e¢ cient
nancial structures and that both internal and external debt can be used as
instruments for tax avoidance. A main nding in our analysis is that a¢ liates
of multinationals with minority owners have less internal debt and thus less
developed tax-e¢ cient nancial structures than multinationalsa¢ liates that
do not have minority ownership. The reason is that a multinational rm
cannot reap the full benet of tax planning when the value of tax savings
must be shared with minority owners that do not contribute to funding tax
planning activities.
Our study has not investigated nancial centers and their explicit set up.
Such centers are often located in countries where the tax base is tailor made
to internal banking, and where the tax base is narrow and often excludes
nancial transactions (as in the case of Belgium). Analyzing nancial centers
would require a model where nancial centers charge transaction fees that
potentially could be used to shift income. Such a set up would then embed
both tax evasion and tax avoidance. This is left for future research.
17Luxembourg and the Netherlands have very similar tax rules concerning nancial
centers as Belgium.
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